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Abstract 
When estimating the extent of e.g.  excess use of public beneﬁts 
one traditionally uses direct monitoring.  Such direct estimates are 
aﬄicted with an intrinsic negative bias since you only count what you 
ﬁnd.  This paper presents and assesses an alternative intuitive, yet 
relatively unexplored, approacht h a tm a y  r e d u c e  t h eb i a sb ym a k ­
ing use of the individual’s own response to information of increased 
monitoring. Through an extensive randomized social experiment we 
apply the method to one particular Swedish public beneﬁt: Parental 
Beneﬁt for Temporary Childcare.  In our view the application was 
successful:  the results are interpretable and we are able to surface 
more hidden excess use through the information method. As a rough 
estimate we ﬁnd that the information based estimate of excess use is 
40 percent higher than the corresponding estimate based on ordin­
ary random monitoring (22.5 percent compared to 16 percent). The 
method is potentially applicable to a large number of related ﬁelds, 
such as e.g. tax evasion and insurance fraud. 
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2	 IFAU — The information method — theory and application 1I n t r o d u c t i o n 
Any  tax  or  transfer  system  may  potentially  be  misused;  it  is  virtually 
impossible to design an insurance, beneﬁt, subsidy or tax that cannot be 
used in a way that is not in line with its set of rules and intentions. Con­
sequently, the economic research in the ﬁelds of monitoring unemployment­
and sickness insurance claimants, tax evasion, and private insurance fraud, 
is vast and ever growing.1  This paper is concerned with the measurement 
of the extent of these illicit activities. Such measurements are intrinsically 
complex due to the fact that the subject does not want the activity to 
be observed.  The literature has produced measures that are often based 
directly on the share of claims etc.  that fail when monitored and closely 
inspected.2  Such estimates are aﬄi c t e dw i t ha n  i n t r i n s i c  w e a k n e s s  i n  t h a t 
they  are  in virtually  all  cases  downward biased;  with  limited  resources 
and realistic legal restrictions you cannot expect to ﬁnd all misuse in the 
selected subset.  The purpose of this paper is to present an alternative 
method — the information method — to estimate the extent of misuse. The 
method is, to a varying degree, applicable in all of the areas mentioned 
above. 
The key ingredient in the information method is a “modest” random­
ized experiment; “modest” in the sense that the treatment does not involve 
ad i ﬀerent set of explicit beneﬁt rules in relation to the  control group, 
which is most often the case in randomized social experiments (see e.g. 
Moﬃtt, 2003, Heckman and Smith, 1995 and Burtless, 1995, for extensive 
surveys of the pros and cons of randomized social experiments).  Instead, 
the only treatment is that a randomly selected group of people is made 
aware that their observance of the set of rules, regarding e.g. the beneﬁt, 
will be monitored more intensely, for a limited time period, than what is 
normally the case.3  Under rather general assumptions, such knowledge 
1 For surveys regarding the incentive problems in unemployment insurance see Fre­
driksson and Holmlund (2006) and Holmlund (1998); for a major randomised experiment 
on the eﬀects of monitoring sickness insurance claimants see Hesselius et al (2005); for 
a seminal contribution on the theory of tax evasion see Allingham and Sandmo (1972) 
and for surveys see Sandmo (2005) and Schneider and Enste (2000 and 2002); and for 
a recent survey on private insurance fraud see Viaene and Dedene (2004). 
2 An important exception is the ﬁeld of measuring tax evasion and the shadow eco­
nomy, in which more innovative indirect estimation techniques are often used; such as 
consumption based estimates (Pissarides and Weber, 1989), Money demand methods, 
(Tanzi, 1983) and electricity based estimates (Lacko, 1998). 
3 When describing the logic behind the information method we will stick to the ex-
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By comparing the average use of the beneﬁt in the treatment group with 
the average use in the control group, we may produce an indirect estimate 
of the average excess use pertaining to the default monitoring intensity 
regime (which is here implicitly assumed to be our target variable); this is 
the basic intuition of the information method. In addition, the announced 
increase in monitoring of the treatment group is indeed carried out.  And 
the average number of withdrawals that fail, despite the announced in­
crease in monitoring,  is an additional ingredient in the full estimate of 
excess use. 
The paper derives the theoretical properties of the estimates generated 
by the information method. It is shown that the method produces estim­
ates  that  are  aﬄicted  with  potentially  smaller  biases  than  the  method 
based on traditional random monitoring does.  In other words, a larger 
part of the hidden excess use may be exposed; On the aggregate rather 
than the individual level, however.  The intuition behind this attractive 
property is that the information based estimate identiﬁes the full amount 
of excess use that is eliminated by the announcement of increased mon­
itoring,  while  traditional  random  sampling  only  partially  identiﬁes  this 
measure. 
In principle, the information method can be applied to a vast number 
of circumstances that involve estimating the general level of observance of 
some regulations or laws.  The basic conditions for when the information 
method may be applied are twofold. First, it must be possible to increase 
the level of monitoring for some randomly selected subset of individuals. 
And second, there must be a measurable individual variable that captures 
the individuals’ “engagements” in the phenomenon that we wish to study; 
in the example of a beneﬁt this variable simply consists of the individu­
als’ use of the beneﬁt,  and in the case of tax evasion it may consist of 
the declared individual income or the level of tax deductions made. How­
ample of a public beneﬁt, since this is the institution that will be subject to our applic­
ation of the method. 
4 U n e m p l o y m e n t  i n s u r a n c eh a s  o f t e nb e e ne x a m i n e du s i n g  r a n d o m i s e d  e x p e r i m e n t s 
featuring monitoring regimes that diﬀer in intensity and design. The disciplinary eﬀect 
that  monitoring  has  on  e.g.  job  search  intensity  is  well  documented,  see  e.g.  Van 
Den Berg and Van Der Klaauw (2006), Dolton and O’Neill (1996), Benus and Johnson 
(1997) and Hägglund (2006).  However, for reasons discussed in this paper (see section 
4.1 below), one may not interpret such disciplinary eﬀects as estimates of pure excess 
use, when studying a very complex beneﬁt such as unemployment insurance. 
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a number of intrinsic characteristics, of the phenomenon that we wish to 
study,  that disqualiﬁes the information method as a fruitful estimation 
technique.  The theoretical part of the paper aims at identifying, in very 
general terms, when the information method is likely to succeed and when 
the results are most easily interpretable. 
The information method is not completely new to the literature (the 
name is, however). We have found at least one prior application. In 1995 
an extensive experiment was carried out by the local tax authority in Min­
nesota to test diﬀerent strategies to inspire the citizens’ inclinations to pay 
taxes (see Coleman, 1996, for the details in the experiment and Slemrod 
et al, 2001, for a scientiﬁc study of tax evasion based on the experiment). 
Some treatment groups were informed that their tax returns would be sub­
ject to increased inspection.  Slemrod et al (2001) interprets the induced 
increase in declared taxes as a potential measure of tax evasion. This is an 
intuitive interpretation and it is indeed the key identiﬁcation strategy used 
in the information method.  However, the interpretation may be more or 
less adequate and fruitful under diﬀerent circumstances.  This is why we 
choose to include a formal treatment of the method.  To our knowledge, 
our theoretical presentation of the method, as a potential improvement 
compared to traditional random monitoring, is new to the literature.  In 
addition to the Minnesota experiment there is a British study carried out 
in 2002 along approximately the same lines (Hasseldine et al, 2007).5  How­
ever, the focus in this study is not explicitly on estimating tax evasion but 
rather on evaluating diﬀerent tax compliance enforcement strategies. 
In addition to the theoretical analysis we present an application of the 
method.  During the spring of 2006 the Swedish Social Insurance Agency 
carried out an extensive randomized experiment on one of its social bene­
ﬁts: Parental Beneﬁt for Temporary Childcare (Tillfällig Föräldrapenning 
för Vård av Barn), which from now on is denoted by its Swedish abbrevi­
ation, VAB. We designed and directed the experiment.6 
5 One important diﬀerence, though, is that the British study was directly aimed at 
entrepreneurs  with  a  turnover  less  than  £  15  000.  There  is  indeed  support  for  the 
stylized fact that self-employed individuals are more likely to engage in tax evasion; see 
e.g. Slemrod et al (2001) and Joulfaian and Rider (1998); it is also the very identifying 
assumption in the expenditure based approach, see e.g.  Pissarides and Weber (1989), 
Engström and Holmlund (2006), Apel (1994), Schuetze (2002), Lyssiotou et al (2004) 
and Tedds (2004). 
6 For a full report on the study see Engström et al (2007). 
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for a pilot study of the information method. The most important feature 
is that it has a very simple set of rules which means that excessive use 
of the beneﬁt is likely to be deliberate and well deﬁned.  In our view the 
application of the information method on the VAB-Beneﬁt was a success. 
The method indeed seems to be able to expose otherwise hidden excess 
use; our point estimates roughly indicate that we found 40 percent more 
excess use with the information method compared to traditional random 
monitoring.  Furthermore,  we  provide  a  robustness  check  that  analyses 
whether the increased estimate stems from some sort of over-reaction to 
the notice of increased monitoring; and we ﬁnd no evidence of such. 
The outline of the paper is as follows.  The ﬁrst sections (2-4) present 
the theoretical properties of the information method.  In Section 2 we set 
up the basic optimization problem facing an individual that may choose to 
misuse a public beneﬁt (the analogous analysis for e.g. tax evasion would 
render the same properties).  Based on this behavioral model, Section 3 
deﬁnes our estimators and compares their properties. We proceed, in sec­
tion 4, by extending the behavioral model along some diﬀerent realistic 
margins in order to characterize some caveats of the information method. 
In Section 5 we turn to the application of the method.  The properties 
of the VAB-Beneﬁt are described, followed by a brief description of the 
experiment. Before presenting the results we also give a brief data descrip­
tion and some words about the statistical method that we employ.  The 
section ends with a robustness analysis regarding whether the individuals 
over-react to the notice of increased monitoring.  Section 6 summarizes 
and concludes the paper. 
2  The basic behavioral model 
T h e r ei sal a r g ep o p u l a t i o no fs i z e  N. Assume further that each individual 
(i) has need (i.e. legitimate use) for some beneﬁt bi (Ω),w h e r e  Ω is a vec­
tor  of  policy  parameters  and  general  macro  variables.  Each  individual 
potentially misuses the beneﬁt to an exogenously given monetary equival­
ent of θ.7  The total observed withdrawal of the beneﬁt( wi) can be written 
wi  = bi + θIi,w h e r e  Ii  is an indicator variable that takes value 1 when 
7 We may introduce endogenous θ without changing the basic qualitative results. We 
will return to these issues in the extensions presented below. 
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risk of getting caught when misusing the beneﬁtg i v e n  b y  p(mi) where mi 
is the level of monitoring aimed at individual i.8  It holds that p0
m > 0 so 
that increased monitoring increases the risk of getting caught with excess 
use. 
There is a ﬁxed heterogeneous moral cost of misuse κi,t h a tc a p t u r e s 
all heterogeneity in the model. The cost of getting caught with misuse (c) 
is taken as exogenous. The expected utility for individual i is then written 
as, 
Ui = bi (Ω)+Ii [θ − (κi + p(mi)c)].  ( 1 ) 
The simple behavioral rule consists of a breakpoint moral cost of misuse 
(κ ¯i) over and at (by assumption) which the individual will choose not to 
engage in misuse.  This breakpoint cost is given by equalizing the gain 
from misusing with the expected cost, 
θ =¯ κi + p(mi)c → κ ¯(mi)=θ − p(mi)c.  ( 2 ) 
We directly see that κ ¯0(mi) < 0 holds, so that the risk of an individual 
misusing the beneﬁt is decreasing in the level of monitoring aimed at him. 
This simply formalizes the very natural property that we may reduce the 
misuse among some group of individuals by letting them know that they 
are exposed to increased monitoring.  The identifying mechanism of the 
information method is built around this simple logic. 
3  Estimating the extent of excess use 
A natural policy objective is to minimize the average amount of excess 
use in the economy among all individuals that are eligible for the beneﬁt. 
Let all individuals face the same ex ante monitoring intensity denoted m. 
This variable (m) should be thought of as a joint measure of the prob­
ability of getting monitored as well as the degree or extent of monitoring 
when actually being exposed.  It is not crucial to our analysis whether 
the individuals’ perceived monitoring intensity actually is correct or not. 
However, in order to simplify the presentation we assume that  the per­
ceived baseline m is the true m. Conditional on m the average excess use, 
8 mi may or may not be known to individual i. The behavioral model simply requires 
that the individual takes one mi  as given and acts on it; whether this anticipation is 
correct or not will be clear from the context. 
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P 
μθ(m) ≡ θ  N Ii(m)
= θ
Nθ(m)
= θE (Ii(m))  (3)
N N 
where Nθ(m) is the number of individuals that misuse the beneﬁt.  The 
key  property  of  μθ(m)  is  that  μ0
θ(m)  ≤  0  holds  since  κ ¯0(m)  <  0  gives 
N0(m) ≤ 0. θ
We  will  now  compare  two  diﬀerent  ways  of  estimating  μθ(m)  (and 
then an additional third way).  The ﬁrst is based on traditional random 
monitoring that is not pre-announced to the subjects. The other is based 
on the same random monitoring, with the only diﬀerence that the mon­
itoring is announced in advance to the individuals that will actually be 
monitored.  We  call  the  ﬁrst  approach  uninformed  monitoring  and  the 
second approach pre-informed monitoring; the diﬀerence lies in whether 
the individuals that are monitored know in advance about the monitor­
ing or not.  In both cases we assume that a monitored individual will be 
exposed to monitoring of degree m∗.  W h e nn o t  i n f o r m e d  y o ut h u sp e r ­
ceive monitoring intensity m, and when informed you perceive monitoring 
intensity m∗; obviously m∗ ≥ m holds — with equality only when the gen­
eral level of monitoring involves monitoring every withdrawal, which is a 
special case we may abstract from.9  A t  t h i s  p o i n tw ea l s oa b s t r a c tf r o m 
the case when type two errors are possible, i.e. when there is a risk of get­
ting caught when using the beneﬁt legitimately; we will look closer at this 
important extension below.  Furthermore, we assume that an individual 
who gets informed that he is subject to monitoring correctly estimates the 
true value p(m∗), and acts accordingly.  In reality there is of course the 
possibility of both over and under estimation of p(m∗).10  We  also  make 
the simplifying assumption that the non-informed individuals — i.e.  both 
those that will end up being monitored in the ordinary uninformed mon­
itoring scheme and those who will not be monitored at all — still estimate 
9 In  this  theoretical part  of the  paper  we  assume,  for  simplicity,  that  the  treated 
individuals get informed that their potential withdrawals of the beneﬁt indeed will be 
monitored (with 100 percent certainty).  This assumption is made only for simplicity. 
The qualitative features of the estimates does not change if the treatment consists of 
declaring that You will be monitored with X percent certainty.  Or, for that matter, 
merely declaring that you will be subject to intensiﬁed monitoring, without being ex­
plicit about the actual risk of monitoring. This latter approach will be the one applied 
in the actual experiment (see the application section below). 
10 The  key  is  only  that  the  informed  individual  perceives  an  increased  monitoring 
intensity; he need not necessarily perceive the correct one. 
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we assume that we may measure the variable μθ(m) without aﬀecting its 
true value in the non-informed population.11 
3.1  Estimate based on uninformed monitoring 
Let Mi be an indicator variable taking on value 1 if the individual is caught 
and zero otherwise.  The expected value of Mi  for a random monitored 
individual, who actually misuses (i.e. Ii =1 ), will be, 
E(Mi|Ii =1 )=  p(m∗) 
and zero otherwise. The uninformed estimate is deﬁned as 
P 
μ ˆθ(m) ≡ θ  n MiIi(m) 
,  ( 4 ) 
n 
where n is the number of people that were randomly selected for monit­
oring. 
When taking the expected value of μ ˆθ(m) we get 
P 
E(ˆ μθ(m)) = p(m∗)θ  n E (Ii(m)) 
= p(m∗)μθ(m) ≤ μθ(m).  (5) 
n 
As long as monitoring is not perfect, p(m∗) < 1, it should come as no 
surprise that the traditional uninformed estimate has a downward bias. 
Its negative bias, B ˆ,w i l lb e 
B ˆ =( 1  − p(m∗)) μθ(m) ≥ 0.  ( 6 ) 
W i t h o u th a v i n gs o m ep r i o r  k n o w l e d g eo ft h e  s i z e  o f  p(m∗) there is not 
much more we can do based on uninformed random monitoring.  We will 
always end up with a weakly negative bias; the lower the risk of getting 
caught when monitored, the higher the negative bias will be. Sometimes it 
is theoretically possible to have p(m∗) very close to unity, but in practice 
it is often extremely costly and/or legally/ethically infeasible.  As we will 
see below, pre-informed monitoring may then be an attractive alternative. 
11 For a discussion regarding this type of "contamination problem" see e.g.  Moﬃtt 
(2004).  In our case an involuntary partial treatment of the control group — say due to 
media attention in response to the experiment — would most likely generate a negative 
bias since it would tend to lower the general excess use of the beneﬁt. 
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Now consider a possible estimate of μθ(m) based on informing the ran­
domly selected individuals in advance, i.e.  the pre-informed monitoring. 
We may then base the estimate on not only the average excess use but 
also on the average reduction in total use of the beneﬁt.  The estimator 
is thus based on the latent assumption that all the information induced 
reduction in use of the beneﬁt can be attributed to excess use.12  Denote 
the estimate based on the information method by μ ˜θ(m).W e  t h e n  d e ﬁne, 
















|  {z  }
Reduction in use of beneﬁt caused by information 
P 
MiIi(m∗)
+  θ  n  , 
|  {z n  }
Remaining excess use found 
where n now represents the number of people informed that they will be 
monitored. The expected value of this estimate is 
E(˜ μθ(m)) = μθ(m) − (1 − p(m∗))μθ(m∗).  ( 8 ) 
and its negative bias is thus 
B ˜ =( 1  − p(m∗))μθ(m∗)  (9) 
Now, since μθ(m) has negative slope, and m∗ >mholds by assumption, 
it holds that B ˜ ≤ B ˆ. This shows that we can get closer (in terms of lower 
bias) to the true variable μθ(m) through the information method, than 
through traditional uninformed random monitoring. 
We may also derive the diﬀerence in negative bias between the two 
estimators. From (6) and (9) we then get, 
B ˆ − B ˜ =( 1  − p(m∗)) (μθ(m) − μθ(m∗)) .  (10) 
From  (10)  some  intuitive  properties  of  the  information  based  estimate 
emerge.  Given  a  reduction  in  excess  use  rendered  by  information,  i.e. 
12 There may be diﬀerent reasons why this assumption does not hold in reality. Tech­
nically we may describe violations of this key assumption as b(Ω) ≡ b(Ω
0,m
∗),s ot h a t 
also the legitimate use of the beneﬁti sa ﬀected by the knowledge of being selected for 
monitoring. We will return to this extension, and the trouble it causes, below. 
10  IFAU — The information method — theory and application μθ(m) − μθ(m∗) > 0, the information based method performs better, in 
relative terms, the harder it is to catch misusers (i.e. the lower p(m∗) is). 
And given p(m∗), the information method performs better the more elastic 
the excess use is to notice of increased monitoring;  in the extreme case 
when all excess use is eliminated through information, i.e. μθ(m∗)=0 ,i t 
is clear from equation (9) that the information based estimate is unbiased. 
The  intuitive  key  to  the  result  lies  in  realizing that in the pre-informed 
estimate we identify all of the reduction in excess use rendered by know­
ledge of increased monitoring.  Let μA
θ  denote the average excess use that 
remains even when the individuals are informed of increased monitoring, 
and let μB
θ  denote the average excess use that is eliminated through in­
formation. By deﬁnition we thus have μθ(m) ≡ μA +μB  The information  θ θ . 
approach identiﬁes the whole of μB
θ  while only part of μA
θ ,i . e .  p(m∗)μA
θ . 
While, on the other hand, traditional random monitoring only identiﬁes 
parts of both μθ
B  and μθ




. μA + μB 
3.3  Consistent estimation of excess use 
It turns out that the uninformed monitoring combined with informed mon­
itoring allows us to go one step further. We may estimate the probability 
to get caught when monitored, p(m∗), consistently.  Once we have a con­
sistent estimate of p(m∗), we only need to scale up the average excess use 
found with uninformed monitoring by the inverse of the estimate of p(m∗), 
in order to get a consistent estimate of μθ(m∗). 
3.3.1  Step one — consistent estimate of p ˆ(m∗) 
Deﬁne p ˆ(m∗) as, 
S S 
MiIi(m)  MiIi(m∗) θ  n n 








(m∗)  .  (11) 
n N−n  − 
Our estimate of the probability to get caught, conditional on misusing and 
being monitored, is given by the information induced change in detected 
excess use divided by the induced behavioral response.  It is straightfor­
ward to conﬁrm that the probability limit of this estimate is 
plim p ˆ(m∗)=p(m∗), 
which proves consistency. 
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We simply proceed by deﬁning our third estimate of μθ(m∗), μ ˘θ(m),a s 






It is straightforward to conﬁrm that this estimator is consistent, since 
plim μ ˆθ(m)  p(m∗)μθ(m)
plim μ ˘θ(m)= =  = μθ(m).
plim p ˆ(m∗)  p(m∗) 
It thus seems that we actually can do better and, at least in this basic 
setup, estimate the average misuse consistently.  There are two problems 
with the estimator, however.  One problem is that the estimate is a non­
linear function of random variables.  Therefore it is not straightforward 
to ﬁnd its variance or probability distribution.  One will have to resort to 
either bootstrapping or approximate methods as e.g.  the Delta method. 
Another problem with the estimator is that it relies on two separate par­
allel studies, the informed estimate and the non-informed estimate, which 
may make the study rather costly to perform. 
4  Extensions and robustness 
In this section we will explore a number of diﬀerent ways to extend the 
basic model.  Our focus will be on how these extensions aﬀect the bias 
and asymptotic bias of our three estimates of average excess use, μ ˆθ(m), 
μ ˜θ(m) and μ ˘θ(m). 
4.1	 When  the  legitimate  use  is  aﬀected  by  the  notice  of 
intensiﬁed monitoring 
In the basic setup above we made the simplifying assumption that the 
legitimate use of the beneﬁt, bi(Ω), is independent of the experiment in 
general and of the actual risk of getting monitored in particular.  As we 
will discuss below, there are a number of reasons why this may not be the 
case in reality.  We start with a short general treatment of the eﬀects on 
our estimators when the legitimate use of the beneﬁt is endogenous to the 
experiment. 
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Now let each individual have two diﬀerent potential levels of legitimate 
demand  of  the  beneﬁt:  ¯ bi  and  bm
i 
∗ 
,w h e r e  ¯ bi  denotes  the  default  level 
m∗
of  legitimate  use  and  bi  is  the  level  of  legitimate  use  conditional  on 
the individual being informed about monitoring. The traditional random 
sampling estimate is naturally indiﬀerent to this extension.  However, the 
information based estimate is not.  The estimate is still given by eq.  (7), 
but the expected value of this estimate will now be, 
E(˜ μθ(m)) = μθ(m) − (1 − p(m∗))μθ(m∗)+  E(¯ bi) − E(bm
i 
∗ 
),  (13) 
which shows that when knowledge of monitoring reduces (increases) the 
legitimate demand for the beneﬁt, there will be an upward (downward) 
pressure on the estimate. 
Regarding the third estimate, μ ˘θ(m), we get that the probability limit 
of eq. (11) now is, 
1
plim p ˆ(m∗) ≡ 
E(¯ bi)−E(bm∗ ) p(m∗), 
1+  i 
μθ(m)−μθ (m∗) 
so that E(¯ bi) >E (bi
m∗ 
) will asymptotically underestimate the true risk of 
getting caught, and vice versa.  In accordance with this we get, directly 
m∗
from eq. (12), that E(¯ bi) >E (bi  ) gives a positive asymptotic bias to the 
previously consistent estimate, and vice versa. 
All in all, these properties are very intuitive.  If we cause a(n) reduc­
tion (increase) in the legitimate use of the beneﬁt by informing individuals 
that they are subject to monitoring, the information method will poten­
tially over-estimate (additionally under-estimate) the true excess use. The 
analogous holds for the third, previously consistent, estimator, μ ˘θ(m). 
4.1.2  Being monitored is costly in itself 
Some  beneﬁts are such that the actual monitoring process involves the 
individual in a way that may be considered cumbersome and associated 
with various personal costs. Such activities may involve: visiting a doctor, 
ﬁlling out forms, attending interviews, social costs of being "inspected" 
etc. Since the individual may avoid monitoring by temporarily restraining 
from using the beneﬁt, such a scenario could lead to information about 
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above such behavior tends to produce an upward bias in the estimates 
based on the information method.  It is therefore very important to, as 
much as possible, reduce the eﬀort needed from the individual in the mon­
itoring process. In cases when substantial individual eﬀort is impossible to 
avoid, one should interpret the information based estimates with a great 
deal of caution.  Unless it is safe to assume that the legitimate use of the 
beneﬁt is very inelastic to the provision of individual eﬀort, one should in 
these cases avoid using the information method altogether. 
4.1.3  Type two error — getting caught without misusing 
It may sometimes be a non-negligible risk that the monitoring authorit­
ies make mistakes and ﬁnd some individuals erroneously guilty of excess 
use.  Apart from the general problems this causes — the traditional ran­
dom sample estimate is potentially aﬄi c t e dw i t ha n  o b v i o u s  p o s i t i v e  b i a s 
—  there is an additional problem  associated with using the information 
method under such circumstances.  The risk of being falsely accused of 
misusing a beneﬁt may indeed restrain individuals from using their full le­
gitimate share; and when getting notice of being subject to monitoring the 
problem obviously increases.  The information based estimates are thus, 
also in this case, aﬄicted with a potentially positive bias.  And if the net 
bias is positive, the use of the information method will produce a larger 
bias than traditional random monitoring will. 
The problem could also occur if the individual is not totally sure of 
the exact border between legitimate use and misuse.  In such case, when 
informed about monitoring, it is possible that people err on the safe side 
and therefore not attain their full legitimate use of the beneﬁt. 
The ﬁrst, rather self-evident, lesson to be learned from this is that good 
quality of the monitoring process is of great importance.  Furthermore, 
the results obtained from information-based estimates, in cases when the 
beneﬁt’s set of rules are hazy, should be interpreted with caution.  It is 
also suggestible to let the information about monitoring be accompanied 
by a pedagogically designed information pamphlet describing the rules of 
the beneﬁt and that the reason for them being selected has nothing to do 
with prior mistrust. 
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It is impossible to inform individuals about them being subjects to mon­
itoring  without  implicitly  also  informing  about  the  beneﬁt’s  existence. 
Everyone does not know about the existence of all beneﬁts that they are 
eligible for.  And some people may know about the existence of some be­
neﬁts that they may or may not be eligible for, but they do not normally 
bother to check in detail.  In such case the information about them being 
the subject to monitoring may make them actively aware of the beneﬁt 
and the exact rules that apply. Such a scenario would tend to increase the 
use of the beneﬁt for the group informed about monitoring, which would 
induce a negative bias in the information based estimates. 
One remedy would be to only include those who have used the beneﬁt 
in  recent  history  in  the  study.  But  this  changes  the  possible  inference 
in a potentially undesired way.  Another potential remedy is to include a 
third group of individuals who only get informed about the existence and 
rules of the beneﬁt. If such a group increases their use of the beneﬁtt oa 
large extent, one has an indication that there may be a problem.  Taking 
this strategy one step further, one could add the increase in average use, 
caused by the pure information of the beneﬁt, to the information based 
estimate.  But such a strategy makes the rather strong assumption that 
the pure information pamphlet eﬀect is the same irrespective of whether 
the pamphlet is accompanied by a letter informing about monitoring, or 
not. 
4.2  Heterogeneous ways of misusing 
So far we have made the simplifying assumption that there was only one 
single  way  to  misuse  the  beneﬁt.  In  reality  this  may  not  be  the  case. 
There are often diﬀerent ways to misuse and they are often heterogeneous 
in both monetary payoﬀ a n di nr i s ko fg e t t i n gc a u g h t . 
Let  there  now  be  two  diﬀerent  ways  of  misusing  the  beneﬁt.  The 
diﬀerence between the two is that one is hard to detect (superscript h) 
and one is easy to detect (superscript e). The price you pay for the excess 
use  that  is  hard  to  detect  is  that  the  monetary  equivalent  of  misusing 
is lower.  The individual has the opportunity to use either one of these 
two strategies of misusing, but not both at the same time.  Given these 
extensions to the basic model above it is straightforward to show that a 
notice of increased monitoring may increase the average surfaced misuse 
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θ (m)) while the average easily detected misuse 
(μe
θ(m)) naturally still decreases. 
Assume further that the variable of interest is as before μθ(m),i . e .  t h e 
average excess use in the economy. This measure may now be divided into 
the two parts: μh
θ (m) and μe
θ(m). The average excess use is thus given by, 
μθ(m)=  μh
θ (m)+  μe
θ(m).  (14) 
We will now compare the properties of our three diﬀerent estimators, 
μ ˆθ(m), μ ˜θ(m) and μ ˘θ(m). 
4.2.1  Uninformed estimation 
Let the two probabilities of getting caught, when monitored and misusing, 
be pe(m∗) and ph(m∗) respectively. The expected value of  the traditional 
random sampling estimate is now given by, 
E (ˆ μθ(m)) = p  e(m∗)μθ
e(m)+  p  h(m∗)μθ
h(m). 
And the negative bias of this estimate is, 
³ ´ 
B ˆ =( 1  − p  e(m∗)) μθ
e(m)+ 1 − p  h(m∗)  μh
θ (m).  (15) 
4.2.2  Information based estimate 
The corresponding expected value for the pre-informed monitoring is given 
by, 
³ ´ 
E(˜ μθ(m)) = μθ
e(m)+μh
θ (m)−(1 − p  e(m∗)) μθ
e(m∗)−  1 − p  h(m∗)  μθ
h(m∗). 
(16) 
I t sn e g a t i v eb i a s  i st h u s , 
³ ´ 
B ˜ =( 1  − p  e(m∗)) μθ
e(m∗)+ 1 − p  h(m∗)  μh
θ (m∗)  (17) 
The ﬁrst thing to note is that we still have  a lower bound estimate of 
the average excess use; the information method will not overestimate the 
excess use. The second important question concerns the relative bias: does 
the information method still outperform traditional random sampling in 
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get, 
³ ´h  i 
B ˆ−B ˜ =( 1− p  e(m∗))[μe
θ(m) − μe
θ(m∗)]+  1 − p  h(m∗)  μh
θ (m) − μθ
h(m∗) 
(18) 
The ﬁrst term on the right hand side of (18) is non negative since increased 
monitoring (weakly) decreases the easily detected excess use.  However, 
the second term may be negative since increased monitoring may increase 
the  excess  use  that  is  hard  to  detect.  It  is  thus  theoretically  possible 
that a relatively large increase in low risk misuse, caused by knowledge 
of monitoring, may make the information approach inferior to traditional 
random sampling, in terms of bias. The extreme case makes the logic clear: 
let pe(m∗)=1  so that the easily detectable misuse is in fact detected in 
all monitored cases.  The relative bias, (18), then simpliﬁes to  ˆ B =  ¡ ¢£  ¤ B −  ˜
1 − ph(m∗)  μh (m) − μh
θ (m∗) .  In this extreme case we will do worst  θ 
with the information based approach as soon as the misuse that is hard to 
detect increases with knowledge of monitoring.  Note that in this case we 
have no gain from using the information method when identifying μe
θ (m) 
since monitoring works perfectly.  In terms of estimating μh
θ (m),w eo n l y 
gain in case knowledge of monitoring actually decreases this type of excess 
use. 
4.2.3  Is consistent estimation still possible? 
We start by proceeding as before and simply estimate the probability of 
getting caught (irrespective of type of misuse) conditional on misuse and 
actually being monitored. It is straightforward to show that, when deﬁning 
p ˆ(m∗) in analogy with (11), the probability will now be, 
plim p ˆ(m∗)=αpe(m∗)+( 1− α)p  h(m∗), 
where, 



























− μh(m∗) θ θ θ θ 
The probability limit of μ ˘θ(m) ≡ μ ˆθ(m)/p ˆ(m∗) then simpliﬁes to, 
plim μ ˘θ(m)= 





,  (19) 
αpe(m∗)+( 1− α)ph(m∗) 










As u ﬃcient condition for the estimator to still be consistent is thus α = 
β.  Furthermore,  since  pe(m∗)  >p h(m∗),a  s u ﬃcient  condition  for  the 
estimator to have an asymptotically non positive bias is β ≤ α. Given the 
deﬁnitions of α and β this condition simpliﬁes to, 


























As u ﬃcient condition for the combined estimate,  μ ˘θ(m),t o  h a v e  a  n o n 
positive asymptotic bias is thus that the easily detectable aggregate excess 
use should be more elastic with respect to information about increased 
monitoring than the excess use that is hard to detect.  In other words, 
as  long  as  information  induces  a  relatively  large  decrease  in  the  easily 
detectable excess use we do not asymptotically overestimate excess use. 
However, the estimate suﬀers from the same qualitative problems as the 
information based estimate, i.e.  the (negative) bias may be large if the 
excess use that is hard to detect increases with information. 
4.2.4  Discussion 
The problems described in this section extends to at least two relatively 
closely related cases. The ﬁrst case is when the individual can make some 
endogenous investment in "stealth technology", i.e.  making it harder to 
detect misuse.  If so, knowledge of monitoring may increase investments 
in stealth technology, which has the same kind of adverse eﬀects on the 
information estimate as the case explored in this section. 
The other case concerns the realistic possibility of engaging in excessive 
use  to  a  varying  degree.  It  is  straightforward  to  extend  the  model  by 
endogenizing θ,  so that the choice of misusing is not just dichotomous. 
When informed about monitoring the workers may switch to a lower level 
of excess use which naturally lowers the risk of detection. If the probability 
to get caught is very elastic to changes in the level of excess use, we could 
also get an analogous eﬀect as the one described here. 
In potential applications of the information method one must ideally 
assess the risk of these problems occurring.  The problems described here 
are of diﬀerent gravity in diﬀerent circumstances.  It must be judged on 
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with the information method. The problem is generally less severe in cases 
when quitting the misuse altogether, under the duration of the experiment, 
is likely to be associated with a relatively low individual cost.  When the 
monitoring process has a high degree of intrinsic randomness, i.e.  when 
pure chance decides to a large degree who gets caught when monitored 
while  misusing,  the  information  method  performs  the  best.  Note  also 
that some degree of asymmetric information regarding the exact means 
and  margins  of  monitoring  would  by  this  logic  work  in  favor  of  using 
the  information  method.  However,  in  the  opposite  scenario,  when  the 
individuals are  aware  of some  very  low risk  way  to  misuse  the  beneﬁt, 
that they may also rather costlessly switch to, the information method is 
likely to perform rather badly. 
5  Application — the VAB-Beneﬁt 
In this section we will present an application of the information method 
on  Swedish  data.  During  the  spring  of  2006  we  designed  and  directed 
an extensive experiment on the VAB-Beneﬁt.  The experiment aimed at 
determining the level of excess use of the beneﬁt, and it was administered 
by the Swedish Social Insurance Agency who also administers the beneﬁt 
itself. 
5.1  About the VAB-Beneﬁta n d  h o w  i tc a n  b e  m i s u s e d 
Basically, the VAB-Beneﬁt gives a parent right to economic compensation 
when he has to take time from work in order to take care of a sick or 
infectious child. VAB-beneﬁts will not be paid when a parent receives sick­
pay, sickness-insurance beneﬁt, is on vacation, is doing military service or 
is in custody in the correctional system.  As a ﬁrst order approximation, 
the VAB-beneﬁt can be drawn for 60 days per year for each child that has 
not reached the age of 12.13  The cost of the VAB-Beneﬁt is about 3 billion 
SEK yearly (7 SEK ≈ $ 1).  The compensation level for the VAB-Beneﬁt 
is at present 80 percent of the wage income.  However,  the part of the 
income that is over a cap (approximately 300 000 SEK per year during 
the experiment period) is not compensated.  The compensation level is 
13 See Engström et al (2007) for an extended presentation of the rules attached to the 
VAB-Beneﬁt. 
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the sick pay system involves an uncompensated qualiﬁcation day, which 
the  VAB-Beneﬁt  does  not  —  when  using  the  VAB-Beneﬁty o u  t h u s  g e t 
reimbursed from day one but when on sick-leave you do not. 
A number of potential ways to misuse the VAB-Beneﬁt emerges. Per­
haps  the  most  obvious  one  is  to  use  the  VAB-Beneﬁt  instead  of  using 
sick-pay, in order to escape the uncompensated qualiﬁcation day. Another 
way  to  misuse  the  beneﬁt  is  to  simply  claim  the  VAB-Beneﬁt  without 
staying home from work, and thus receive double payments. Other poten­
tial ways of misusing include black market work or receiving some other 
beneﬁt at the same time (e.g. unemployment beneﬁt). The monitoring of 
withdrawals includes both contacts with employer and schools/pre-schools 
as well as cross-checking in registers for multiple beneﬁts. 
5.2  The experimental setup and execution 
The experiment can be described as follows. First, a randomized selection 
of the eligible individuals was selected to be included in a treatment group. 
These individuals were informed through letters notifying them that they 
were included in a randomized group whose use of the VAB-Beneﬁtw e r et o 
be exposed to intensiﬁed monitoring for a period of time.14  The individuals 
in the treatment group were not informed whether they actually were to 
be monitored or how substantial the risk for this was.  It turned out that 
about 30 percent of all individuals in the treatment group, who used the 
beneﬁt during the experiment period, got their withdrawals monitored. 
The treatment group consisted of three diﬀerent sub-groups of sizes, 28 
543 (A), 7 051 (B) and 6 655 (C): group A, received both the information 
letter about increased monitoring and a short pamphlet explaining the set 
of rules attached to the beneﬁt; group B received only the pamphlet (with 
an explanatory text declaring that the pamphlet was part of a campaign); 
and group C received only the information letter about increased monit­
oring.  This division of the treatment groups partially aimed at assessing 
the margin discussed in section 4.1.4, i.e. to what extent does this type of 
information make the individuals "discover" the beneﬁt.  We also wanted 
to keep an eye on whether the reaction diﬀered to a large extent when 
there was no accompanying information pamphlet; an over-reaction to the 
letter is arguably more plausible when there is no accompanying pamphlet 
14 See Appendix for the exact reproduction of the information letter. 
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relevant treatment groups are A and C, since they get informed about be­
ing subject to increased monitoring; we will often merge these two groups, 
in which case the joint group will be referred to as group AC. 
Letters and information pamphlets, to the selected caretakers in the 
diﬀerent treatment groups, were sent out on the 24th of March 2006. The 
majority of those reached its receivers four days later on the 28th.T h e 
experiment period started on the 29th  o f  M a r c ha n d  c a r r i e do nu n t i l  t h e 
31st  of May.15  The Swedish Social Insurance Agency also established a 
temporary call-center and a special e-mailbox where those who received 
the letters (group A and C) could turn with questions;  this was one of 
the strategies for reducing the  risk of  an over-reaction to the  notice  of 
increased monitoring (see sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3). 
From those who were selected to the three treatment groups, a certain 
share (about 30 percent) had their withdrawals from the VAB-Beneﬁte x ­
amined. The chosen individuals’ withdrawals were closely checked through 
contacts with employers  and pre-schools/schools,  and also crosschecked 
against the unemployment beneﬁts etc.  The absence was checked with 
the employer during the compensated time along with the grounds for ab­
sence (care for sick child, vacation, compensatory leave, work allocation, 
or else); while the child’s absence status, and reason for potential absence, 
was checked with school/pre-school. 
5.3  Data 
The data were collected from the administrative registry of the Swedish 
Social Insurance Agency and cover all withdrawn VAB-beneﬁts in Sweden 
during the periods of interest.  Our population is deﬁn e db yt h o s e  w h o 
are eligible for the beneﬁt — in principle every caretaker, with a few ex­
ceptions, with children in the age 1-11 years old.16  This means that the 
population, approximately, consists of all Swedish caretakers of children 
born between 1st of June 1994 and 20th of March 2005. The selection into 
15 The exact timing of the experiment had to be determined by practical considera­
tions. Much eﬀort was put into ﬁnalizing the experiment before the summer (when the 
VAB-withdrawals are the lowest). 
16 The individuals who were unregistered, taken into custody, doing military service, 
caretakers with protected identity and persons missing from the tsunami-catastrophe 
were not included in the treatment group or remaining population. 
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of the caretakers. 
Table 1.  Descriptive statistics for the treatment groups (A, B and C) 
and the remaining population (D). 
Group  Number of individuals  Share of women  Average age 
A  28 543  0.516  38.26 
[0.003]  [0.04] 
B  7 051  0.512  38.24 
[0.006]  [0.08] 
C  6 655  0.514  38.26 
[0.006]  [0.08] 
D  1 272 993  0.515  38.29 
[0.0004]  [0.006] 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 2.  Percentage share withdrawing VAB-Beneﬁt an average day 
during the reference period (2005-10-01 until 2006-02-28). 
Group  Woman  Men  All 
A  1.37  0.88  1.14 
[0.022]  [0.020]  [0.015] 
B  1.42  0.82  1.13 
[0.046]  [0.035]  [0.029] 
C  1.50  0.95  1.23 
[0.050]  [0.043]  [0.033] 
D  1.40  0.86  1.14 
[0.003]  [0.003]  [0.002] 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 1 shows the number of individuals, age and gender distribution 
in the diﬀerent groups.  In total 42 249 individuals were included in some 
treatment group; 28 543 were in group A, 7 051 in group B and 6 655 in 
group C. The remaining population (group D) contains 1 272 993 individu­
als. It should be noted that there are no statistical signiﬁcant gender and 
age diﬀerences when comparing the diﬀerent treatment groups (A, B and 
C) to the remaining population (D).17  Neither are there any signiﬁcant 
diﬀerences between these variables when comparing the treatment groups 
in pairs. 
We have used a reference period against which the diﬀerent groups’ 
withdrawals may be compared (see the exact reason for this in the next 
subsection  where  we  describe  the  statistical  method).  We  decided  to 
use the six months that preceded the experiment period, minus a “buf­
fer  month”  in  between  the  reference  period  and  the  actual  experiment 
period.18  Our reference period was thus made out of the 5 months between 
05-10-01 and 06-02-28. 
If the random selection process has been correct, the expected with­
drawal patterns within the diﬀerent groups are identical.  Table 2, that 
presents the average fraction of men and woman that made withdrawals, 
as well as the average number of VAB-Beneﬁt days during the reference 
period, shows that there were no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the groups 
A, B and the remaining population (D). But for the small group C, the 
withdrawal is signiﬁcantly larger than it was in group D. One explanation 
for this could be pure chance:  we may have got an unusual high average 
need of the beneﬁt among the caretakers in group C.19 I f  w e  i n s t e a dl o o ka t 
group A and C jointly (the AC-group), the signiﬁcant diﬀerences between 
all remaining groups (AC, B and D) disappear.  Since the C-group’s con­
stitution, concerning a number of variables — such as age, gender, sector, 
income etc.  — does not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the other groups, we con­
17 This also holds for a number of other characteristics, such as:  sectoral belonging, 
income, education etc. 
18 The reason for using a “buﬀer month” is that some people linger with their ap­
plications for VAB-Beneﬁt for a few weeks.  When an individual, in the end of March, 
receives the letter about intensiﬁed monitoring, there is thus a possibility that he re­
duces earlier withdrawals retroactively.  This could produce an underestimation of the 
letter’s eﬀect. 
19 It should also be noted that the diﬀerence does not disappear when we cut the top 
of the withdrawal distribution, which means that it is not due to a small number of 
extreme outliers, producing the higher number of withdrawals in group C. 
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the  C-group,  simply  by  chance,  has  been  assigned  a  larger  fraction  of 
individuals with a somewhat increased demand for VAB-Beneﬁt. 
5.4  Statistical method 
Our  estimate  of  the  total  excess  use  of  the  VAB-Beneﬁtw i l lh a v et w o 
components: it is partly made out of the potential decrease in withdrawals 
induced by the letters, and partly of the results of monitoring in itself. 
The statistical analyses behind the two measures are separate.  We will 
therefore describe the underlying analysis of each component separately. 
Finally, we will describe how we aggregate the two separate measures into 
a total measure of excess use. 
5.4.1  The letter eﬀect 
When estimating the eﬀect of the information letter we are able to choose 
from two unbiased estimators: the traditional "Diﬀerence-Estimator" (D-
Estimator) or the "Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences-Estimator" (DiD-Estimator). 
Since both estimators are unbiased, the choice of which one to use could 
be  made  based  on  the  estimators’  variances.  Theoretically,  the  DiD-
Estimator outperforms the D-Estimator when there is substantial, time­
invariant, individual variation in the variable.  The intuition is that the 
DiD-Estimator eliminates the individual speciﬁc component already when 
taking the (ﬁrst) diﬀerence at the individual level over time, while with 
the D-estimator the individual speciﬁc component is simply averaged out. 
However, if there is a large time variation there may be a high cost, in terms 
of increased variance, of taking the ﬁrst diﬀerence in order to normalize 
against earlier withdrawal pattern. In our case the sample variances of the 
two diﬀerent estimators are approximately the same.  However, we have 
reason to believe (see the data-section above) that we have, by chance, 
gotten a  rather  skewed sample  in  the  small  C-group;  this  group shows 
an exceptionally high withdrawal pattern during the reference period.  If 
this  is  due  to  individual-speciﬁc  components,  rather  than  time-speciﬁc 
components,  there are problems using the simpler D-Estimator.  Given 
a skewed sample, with regards to the individual-speciﬁc component, the 
D-estimator is biased, since the individual-speciﬁc component is not elim­
inated at the individual level.  However, the DiD-Estimator may still be 
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data on earlier withdrawals.  We have therefore chosen to use the DiD-
Estimator instead of the D-Estimator (using the D-Estimator gives very 
diﬀerent results for the C-group, but only marginally diﬀerent results when 
looking at the joint treatment group AC). 
In order to make the results more easily interpretable we normalize 
the eﬀect by dividing our estimates with the average withdrawal in the 
unaﬀected D-group during the experiment period, i.e., 
P 
ex  D wi
ex(m) 
w ¯D  . ≡ 
nD 
ex We  treat  w ¯D  as a constant in the derivations below.20  Technically, the 
letter eﬀect (hence superscript L) is measured by the DiD-estimator, 
S k 
ref  ex 
l  S k 


















(21) ex  ex 
D D 
where superscript ref  and ex indicate reference period and experiment 
periods,  respectively,  and subscript S  =[ A, B, C, AC] indicates current 
treatment group.  21 
5.4.2  The monitoring component 
The  monitoring  component  (μ ˜M )  of  the  information  based  estimate  is  θS 
straightforward to derive.22  We have monitored a fraction (about 30 per­
cent) of the individuals with at least one withdrawal during the experi­
ment period (we denote this subset, s+). We thus have an estimate of the 
20 Treating it as a random variable makes no practical diﬀerence. 
21 The corresponding D-Estimator, on the other hand, would be given by, 
S S  ex  ex 
D wi S wi 
nD  −  nS  .  ex w ¯D 
22 For computational purposes the most straightforward derivation would have been 
to simply randomize out a sub-sample of all individuals in each treatment group and  S 
MiIi(m∗)o  ex 
then estimate μ ˜
M  s i  directly.  However, the sample procedure was in  θS  ≡  ns 
reality conditional on the individual making a positive withdrawal during the experiment 
period.  We thus had the monitoring results of a pre-determined number of individuals 
with positive withdrawals, which makes the estimation of the monitoring component 
slightly more complicated. 
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withdrawals for each separate treatment group, i.e., 
P 
μ ˜M 
s+ MiIi( i  θs+  f ˆ S =  P  ex 
m∗)θex 
ex  (22) 
s+ wi  (m∗) 
≡ 
w ¯s+ 
where (s+ ⊂ S+)=[ ( a+ ⊂ A+), (b+ ⊂ B+), (c+ ⊂ C+), (ac+ ⊂ AC+)] are 
the monitored sub-samples of the individuals in each treatment group that 
have positive withdrawal during the experiment period.  The variance of 
f ˆ S  is estimated with the Delta method, taking the estimated covariance 
between the numerator and the denominator into consideration.23  In order 
to arrive at the normalized monitoring component we need only multiply  ³ ´ 




ex  so as to compensate for the adjusted 
D 
average level of withdrawal in each treatment group, i.e. 
μ ˜M  µ
μ ˜L  ¶
θS  f ˆ S 
θS 
ex  = 1 −  ex  .  (23) 
w ¯D  w ¯D 
5.4.3  Total measure 
The total information-based estimate of average excess use is the sum of 
the letter component and the monitoring component, i.e., 
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The estimated variance for this total estimate can be expressed using the 
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However,  a  large  average  response  to  the  letter  is  likely  to  reduce  the 
average number of withdrawals that fail when monitored.  It is therefore 
natural that the covariance is negative. We may then simply err on the safe 
side and estimate the variance as if the two components were uncorrelated. 
5.5  Results 
In Figure 1 the eﬀect of the letter declaring increased monitoring is clearly 
visible. The two lines, representing the average withdrawal patterns of the 
AC and D groups, follow each other quite closely until the start of the ex­
periment period.  When entering the period with increased monitoring 
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Figure 1.  VAB-Beneﬁt withdrawn in SEK per individual and week, for the 
AC-group and the D-group (from week 40/2005 until week 22/2006). 
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becomes even clearer. 
Figure 2.  Relative diﬀerence between weekly withdrawn amount in the AC 
group  compared  to  the  D-group  ((AC-D)/D)  (from  week  40/2005  until  week 
22/2006). 
Table 3.  The main results of the study:  letter eﬀect (Eq.  21), monit­










































Group  letter eﬀect  monitoring component  total estimate 
A  0.129  0.102  0.232 
[0.019]  [0.009]  [0.021] 
B  -0.044  0.167 
[0.039]  [0.023] 
C  0.141  0.059  0.200 
[0.041]  [0.011]  [0.043] 
AC  0.132  0.093  0.225 
[0.017]  [0.007]  [0.019] 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.

28  IFAU — The information method — theory and application
These eyeball statistics have been translated into numbers in Table 3, 
which also presents the outcome of the monitoring component, as well as 
the separate results for all groups (A, B, C and the joint group AC). We 
see that the eﬀect of the letter is negative and signiﬁcant (95 percent) in 
both the A and the C groups; the eﬀect is insigniﬁcantly larger in the C 
group (14.1 percent) than in the A group (12.9 percent).  The pure eﬀect 
of the information pamphlet (the B group) is not statistically signiﬁcant; 
the point estimate shows a slight increase in withdrawal of 4.4 percent. 
The results concerning the monitoring component (Column 3) mirror the 
eﬀects of the letter:  the highest amount of failed withdrawals in group 
B (16.0 percent) followed by group A (11.8 percent) and then group C 
(6.9 percent).  To get the estimates of total excess use we simply add the 
results from column 2 and 3 together (this is not the case for group B 
since they did not get the disciplinary treatment). The total estimates of 
excess use can be found in column 4. There are no statistically signiﬁcant 
diﬀerences between the total estimates of excess use between group A and 
group C. Our preferred information based estimate of total relative excess 
use is given by the full treatment group, AC. In this group we estimate 
that 22.5 percent of the withdrawn SEK stems from excess use. 
Unfortunately the Swedish Social Insurance Agency did not grant the 
extra resources needed to perform a parallel study of uninformed random 
monitoring that would facilitate the use of the third, potentially consistent, 
estimator of excess use.  As a rough estimate, though, we may regard the 
B-group as relatively unaﬀected. Under the arguably realistic assumption 
that the detected average excess use in the B-group has the same expected 
value as the corresponding measure in the D-group we could proceed and 
derive a third estimate.  We would then get a point estimate of the prob­
ability to get caught when monitored, without being informed, of about 
44 percent.  This, in turn, would give a third point estimate of the aver­
age excess use of about 36 percent of the withdrawn amount.  We have, 
however, chosen not to pursue this line of reasoning since preliminary cal­
culations indicate that the B-group seems much too small to produce a 
reliable estimate.  In order for the third estimator to be used one would 
have to have made a rigorous parallel study based on purely uniformed 
random monitoring. Even so, we do regard the increase in the estimate of 
excess use in group AC relative to group B, which is about 40 percent and 
statistically signiﬁcant (16.7 percent in group B and 22.5 percent in group 
AC), as an indication that the information method does indeed reveal hid-
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the relatively small and statistically insigniﬁcant diﬀerence in withdrawal 
pattern in the B-group compared to the unaﬀected D-group, It is unlikely 
that the whole diﬀerence in estimates (AC compared to B) stems from the 
rather modest treatment experienced by the B-group. 
5.6  Sub-group analysis 
In this section we study if diﬀerent sub-groups are particularly prone to 
excess use of the VAB-Beneﬁt. 
Table 4.  Sub-group results for the AC-group. 
Sub-group  letter eﬀect  monitoring component  total estimate 
Gender 
Men  0.189 [0.029]  0.113 [0.015]  0.280 [0.028] 
woman  0.095 [0.021]  0.103 [0.010]  0.189 [0.021] 
Sector

Private  0.152 [0.022]  0.111 [0.010]  0.246 [0.022]

Public  0.110 [0.028]  0.091 [0.015]  0.192 [0.028]

Education 
Compulsory school  0.279 [0.065]  0.187 [0.038]  0.413 [0.060] 
High-school  0.187 [0.023]  0.098 [0.010]  0.267 [0.023] 
Post high-school  0.014 [0.027]  0.099 [0.013]  0.112 [0.028] 
Region 
Metropolitan area  0.124 [0.027]  0.144 [0.013]  0.250 [0.026] 
Major population centre  0.141 [0.029]  0.074 [0.011]  0.205 [0.028] 
Rural area  0.129 [0.034]  0.085 [0.019]  0.202 [0.0235] 
Age 
- 33  0.133 [0.030]  0.092 [0.013]  0.212 [0.029] 
34 - 37  0.115 [0.032]  0.117 [0.017]  0.219 [0.032] 
38 - 41  0.184 [0.036]  0.107 [0.018]  0.271 [0.035] 
42 - 0.087 [0.042]  0.117 [0.018]  0.194 [0.040] 
Income group 
Men below median  0.167 [0.040]  0.106 [0.018]  0.255 [0.039] 
Men above median  0.210 [0.042]  0.119 [0.022]  0.304 [0.041] 
Women below median  0.122 [0.031]  0.090 [0.014]  0.201 [0.031] 
Women above median  0.075 [0.028]  0.112 [0.013]  0.179 [0.028] 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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We  conﬁne  our  presentation  to  cover  only  groups  based  on  gender, 
sector, educational level, region, age and income.  The results are for the 
whole AC group and refers to withdrawn amounts (the results based on 
days of VAB-use are approximately the same). The estimates for each cat­
egory are presented in Table 4 and can be summarized with two signiﬁcant 
ﬁndings. Firstly, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the sexes. Excess 
use of the beneﬁt by men is estimated to 28 percent of the amount with­
drawn by men, while the same measure for women is about 19 percent. 
This should be interpreted in the sense that a given amount of beneﬁt 
handed out to a man is likelier to stem from excess use, than if it was paid 
out to a woman.  Secondly, we ﬁnd that excess use decreases with educa­
tion attainment.  In the group with only nine-year compulsory school the 
excess use is estimated to 41.3 percent, while the corresponding number 
for the group with at most high-school education is 26.7 percent. However, 
the group with the lowest education level is relatively small, both in size 
as well as in share of withdrawals. When turning to the excess use of the 
group with the highest education, post high-school, we ﬁnd a substantial 
decrease in excess use.  The excess use is estimated to 11.2 percent in the 
group  with  the  highest  education.  All  three  estimates are  signiﬁcantly 
diﬀerent from each other. 
5.7  Robustness — do people over-react to the letter? 
As described in section 4.1.2 and 4.1.3, the potential risk for positively 
biased estimates of excess use is the risk of over-reactions to the informa­
tion about increased monitoring. A number of measures have been taken in 
the experimental design to reduce the risk of such reactions (see Engström 
et al, 2007, for a more thorough discussion of these issues). However, it is 
naturally of great value to measure the extent or ﬁnd indications of such 
reactions.  Fortunately, this particular beneﬁt provides us with a fruitful 
strategy to go about this. 
The schools and pre-schools do not usually admit sick children, due 
to  the  risk  of  contamination  as  well  as  the  increased  workload.  Since 
the sickness status of the child is an often binding constraint,  a parent 
who overreacts to the letter must ﬁnd a substitute caretaker. An obvious 
candidate is the partner, since the letter is very clear on that it is only 
“Your” individual use of the VAB-Beneﬁtt h a tw i l lb e  s u b j e c t  t o  i n c r e a s e d 
monitoring.  Even  if  grandparents  who  are  no  longer  working  in  some 
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choice.  Since we have data on the partners, we can examine whether an 
overreaction is at hand by studying the implicit reaction of the partner to 
the ones exposed to the treatment (in particular group A and C). Since 
the eﬀect on the partner is likely to be larger if the two caretakers actually 
live together we try to limit the sample to the traditional nuclear family. 
However, we have not got the information on whether the caretakers of 
the child live together or not. In the cases when a child’s caretakers have 
changed, we do not know who the current caretakers are. For this reason 
we have restricted our population to the observations where the children 
only have had two caretakers during their lifetime and when those and the 
child was registered in the same parish and when none of the caretakers 
have children in the age of 1 to 11 years together with another partner. 
We also exclude all “families” where both caretakers have had any kind 
of treatment (A, B or C). Given this selection of population we have a 
remaining 83.6 percent of the original population, which is close to oﬃcial 
numbers  from  Statistics  Sweden  for  the  year  2004  that  shows  that  78 
percent of the children in the age 1 to 11 years old lives with their original 
parents.24 
We ﬁnd that the letters’ cross-eﬀects on the partners in the main treat­
ment  group,  AC,  consist  of  an  insigniﬁcant  reduction  in  withdrawal  of 
VAB-Beneﬁt (2.6 percent with standard deviation 1.9 percent).  If the ef­
fect had been positive, it had been consistent with the over-reaction hypo­
thesis described above, and we would have an indication of a potentially 
serious positive bias in our estimate of excess use.  Since such reaction 
did not occur we may be less concerned with the risk of over-reaction. 
However, if there are two counteracting eﬀects, one substitution and one 
disciplinary (if some interpret the letter as the whole family being mon­
itored even though the letter was very clear on that it was the receiver, 
and not a particular child, that was the focus for monitoring) we can get a 
net result that does not show any eﬀect in the aggregate. It is principally 
possible that what we measure is the sum of a positive eﬀect (when you 
let the partner take care of the sick child) and a negative contamination 
eﬀect (the disciplinary eﬀect on the partner). However, two counteracting 
eﬀects tend to increase the variance of the variable in question. A compar­
ison of the distribution of the diﬀerences in paid amount between the AC 
24 It is natural that we get a somewhat higher number than Statistics Sweden, since 
we include those parents who are separated but still live in the same parish. 
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consideration, we feel safe to conclude that, in this particular study, there 
is not a substantial problem with overreaction in response to the letters. 
6  Concluding remarks 
The paper has presented a relatively unexplored method for estimating 
the level of incorrect use of e.g.  a public beneﬁt.  Our fundamental start­
ing point is that excess use of a public beneﬁt is tricky to measure due to 
the fact that those who engage in it naturally prefer the activity to go un­
noticed. Estimates based on traditional random monitoring will therefore 
be aﬄicted with a potentially large negative bias. The same logic applies 
to other illicit activities, such as tax evasion and insurance fraud. 
The  method  is  based  on  the  intuitive  notion  that  knowledge  of  in­
creased monitoring have disciplinary eﬀects on the withdrawal patterns of 
individuals that misused the beneﬁt; such a mechanism is straightforward 
to derive from any behavioral model irrespective of the exact underlying 
assumptions. The key identifying mechanism of the method is this discip­
linary eﬀect. When a random subset of the eligible population is informed 
that they are to be monitored more extensively, we may, under some ad­
ditional assumptions,  interpret the induced reduction in outtake of the 
beneﬁt as a component in our estimate of excess use.  In the theoretical 
part of the paper we show how such a strategy may alleviate some of the 
intrinsic downward bias generally aﬄicting traditional direct estimates of 
excess use. 
In the application part of the paper the method is tested on one par­
ticular Swedish public beneﬁt:  Parental Beneﬁt for Temporary Childcare 
(VAB-Beneﬁt). Our assessment is that the application of the information 
method was successful.  As a rough appraisal we ﬁnd that the estimated 
average  excess  use  of  the  VAB-Beneﬁt  increased  with  40  percent  when 
the information method was used — traditional random monitoring gives 
about 16 percent excess use while the information method gives 22.5 per­
cent excess use. This conﬁrms the theoretical notion that a larger part of 
the hidden excess use may be found when using the information method. 
We argue that the particular beneﬁt studied was quite well suited for 
using the information method; the main reason for this being its relatively 
simple and transparent set of rules, which is a key criterion for the method 
to deliver easily interpretable results.  The theoretical part of the paper 
IFAU — The information method — theory and application  33 tries to assess both pros and cons of the information method. We identify 
certain criteria under which the information method must be used with a 
great deal of caution. There are also cases when one should restrain from 
using the information method altogether, at least in the basic form that 
we have presented here. 
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Monitoring of temporary parental beneﬁt 
You have been selected for special monitoring concerning temporary 
parental beneﬁt.  The monitoring concerns claims and compensations for 
temporary parental beneﬁt during the period of the 29th of March to the 
30th of May 2006. The Swedish Social Insurance Agency is going to carry 
out inspections by e.g. contacting employers, day care and schools. 
The fact that you have been selected has nothing to do with earlier 
withdrawals of temporary parental beneﬁt. You may not necessarily have 
applied for temporary parental beneﬁt in the past. We have used a method 
of random selection.  The reason for You being selected is thus not that 
you are suspected of cheating. It is equally probable for all having children 
in the ages of 1-11 to be selected for intensiﬁed monitoring. 
The increased inspection represents a part of a bigger work to coun­
teract cheating and oﬀences against public compensations. 
I f  y o uh a v eq u e s t i o n s  o n  t h i s ,  p l e a s ef e e lf r e et oc o n t a c t  u s .  P l e a s eu s e 
our e-mailbox:  kontroll.tfp@forsakringskassan.se.  If you prefer to talk to 
us, the phone number is 020 — 45 00 56. 
If you wish to learn more about the Swedish Social Insurance Agency 
and temporary parental beneﬁt ,  y o um a y  v i s i to u r  w e bs i t e 
www.forsakringskassan.se. 
The Swedish Social Insurance Agency 
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